WOOD, JR., J.:. . . After Fancy & Company (“Fancy Colors”)
WOOD, JR., J.:. . . After Fancy & Company (“Fancy Colors”)
WOOD, JR., J.:. . . After Fancy & Company (“Fancy Colors”) terminated his employment, Michael D. Van Stan (“Van Stan”) sued Fancy Colors contending that Fancy Colors' conduct in firing him amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury awarded Van Stan damages of 5150,000 for intentional infliction of emotional dis-tress. We reverse the entry of judgment against Fancy Colors on the intentional infliction of emotional dis-tress claim. Under Illinois law, which the parties both agree applies, a plaintiff may recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress only if he establishes that (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was at least a high probability that his conduct would inflict severe emotional distress, and (3) the defendant% conduct did cause severe emotional distress. Conduct is extreme and outrageous only if “the conduct has been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.. . .” “Mere insults. indignities, threats, annoyances. petty oppressions, or other trivialities” do not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct, nor does conduct “characterized by mal-ice or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort” More-over, we judge whether conduct is extreme and outrageous on an objective standard based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular Case. Thus. to serve as a basis for recovery, the defendant% conduct must be such that the -`recitation of facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim 'Outrageous!'” In the employment context, Illinois courts have recognized that personality conflicts and questioning of job performance are “unavoidable aspects of employ-ment” and that “frequently, they produce concern and distress.” The courts have reasoned, however, that if such incidents were actionable, nearly all employees would have a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, Illinois courts have limited recovery to cases in which the employer's conduct has been truly . See, e.g., Pavilon Kaferly (the employer, knowing that the plaintiff was susceptible to emotional distress, offered her money for sexual favors, fired her after she refused, and after he fired her, threatened to kill her, to rape her, and to file a legal action challenging her rights to custody of her child and attempted to disrupt her new employment relationship); Milton v. Illinois Bell . . . . (the employer engaged in an extensive course of disciplinary and harassing conduct to coerce the plaintiff to falsify work reports). In contrast, Illinois courts have denied recovery for distress resulting from recognizably reprehensible conduct which has been linked to an employer's legitimate interest. In Harris v. First Fed. Sao! 6 Loan of Chicago an Illinois appellate court held that a plain-tiff who alleged that her employer criticized, demoted, and discharged her after she reported allegedly criminal activity to her supervisor did not state a claim because she did not allege that her employer engaged in this course of conduct to coerce her into engaging in illegal activity. While the court characterized the employer's conduct as “reprehensible,” the court held that it did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct because the employer merely acted out of displeasure with the plaintiff's exercise of judgment regarding another employee's conduct. Recognizing this high threshold, this Court and other federal courts applying Illinois law have denied recovery to plaintiffs who alleged that their employers subjected them to a continuous series of intention-ally discriminatory acts. For example, in we held that the plaintiff failed to allege conduct that
rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct even though she contended that among other things her employer refused to allow her to supervise white subordinates, reprimanded her for no reason, refused to allow her to participate in a management incentive fund, forced her out of her management position, promised her a promotion she never received, took away from her major accounts and gave her less lucrative accounts in return, excluded her from office activities, monitored her telephone calls with an eavesdropping device and ignored concerns of her health and safety after her personal property was damaged on company property. See also Briggs v. North Shore Sanitary Dist. (Allegations that the plaintiff's employer and fellow employees hung a doll in her office, subjected her to racial slurs, excluded her from office social activities, placed her on probation, and refused to train her properly did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, but allegations that co-workers exposed her to toxic fumes for more than eight hours did). In this case, Van Stan maintains that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, a reasonable jury could have found that Walters (Van Stan's supervisor,' and other Fancy Colors super-visors knew that Van Stan suffered from a bipolar disorder, that Fancy Colors fired Van Stan because his disorder required him to work less hours, that Walters telephoned Van Stan at home while he was on vacation to inform him that he had been terminated and that after Van Stan requested an explanation, Walters falsely told Van Stan that he was being fired for low productivity. While we do not mean to condone such conduct, we do not believe that this course of conduct was akin to the type of egregious conduct present in and Milton, nor do we believe that it exceeded all possible bounds of decency. Thus, as a matter of law Fancy Colours' conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, and Fancy Colors is entitled to a judgment in its favor. Reversed.
Case Question
1. What was the conduct that plaintiff Van Stan claimed was -extreme and outrageous”?
2. What does the court say about what would happen if more -personality conflicts and questioning of job performance” amounted to intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress?
3. Why is the Illinois case in federal court?
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