Discuss the case surrounding self-help guru James Arthur Ray who was recently sentenced to two years in prison for the deaths of three people in a 2009 sweat lodge ceremony in Arizona
The icebreaker for this Discussion is as follows:share a quote with the class that reflects something about you your life and your experiences.Discuss the case surrounding self-help guru James Arthur Ray who was recently sentenced to two years in prison for the deaths of three people in a 2009 sweat lodge ceremony in Arizona. What are your thoughts about his conviction and sentence?Is there a line between protecting cultural traditional healing and protecting peoples lives/health? If so what is the line? Who determines it?Please remember everyone is entitled to express their opinions and discussions or differences of opinion must remain respectful. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/19/james-arthur-ray-sentenced_n_1102753.htmlSpringer 2007Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 79:395405DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9405-5Stakeholder Management Capability:A DiscourseTheoretical ApproachABSTRACT. Since its inception Stakeholder Management Capability (SMC) has constituted a powerfulhermeneutic through which business organizations haveunderstood and leveraged stakeholder relationships. Onthis model achieving a high level of capability largelydepends on managerial ability to effectively bargain withstakeholders and establish solidarity vis-a`-vis the successfulnegotiation implementation and execution of winwin transactional exchanges. Against this account it isrightly pointed out that a transactional explanation ofstakeholder relationships regarded by many as the bottomline for stakeholder management fails to provide managerial direction regarding how to resolve a variety ofnormative stakeholder claims that resist commoditization.In response to this issue this paper has two overlappinggoals. It seeks to elaborate a discourse theoreticalapproach to the problem by first drawing out JurgenHabermas theory of communicative action and delineating the various types of rational discourse. Second thepaper attempts to present concrete implications for SMCrelative to reshaping the contours of rational processand transactional analysis in light of central discoursetheoretical conclusions.KEY WORDS: critical theory discourse ethics stakeholder management capability stakeholder managementtheory communicative actionIntroductionManagerial stakeholder models often representattempts to understand and describe a wide variety ofbusiness relationships as forms of transactionalDr. Abe J. Zakhem works primarily in the areas of ethical theoryand business ethics. He has worked in private industry as asenior management consultant and chief operating officer andis currently an assistant professor at Seton Hall University.Abe Zakhemexchange. In very general terms transactional relationships involve the mutual and voluntary trade ofassets for gain. Now broadly construed assetscorrespond to a wide range of tangible (e.g. capitaland labor) and intangible (e.g. goodwill and socialcapital) interests and associated metrics. Since its original characterization (Freeman 1984) the notion ofStakeholder Management Capability (SMC) hasconstituted one of the more influential and transactional frameworks for understanding and leveragingstakeholder relationships. Essentially SMC involvesmanagerial analysis at rational process and transactional levels. Corresponding to each level of analysismanagers are charged with: 1) mapping stakeholdersand identifying their perceived stakes 2) structuringorganizational processes to reflect and align organizational and stakeholder goals and expectations and3) negotiating transactions or bargains with stakeholders sufficient for balancing competing interestsand surfacing discontent. On this model achieving ahigh-level of capability indeed the very bottomline for SMC comes down to the success or failureof transactional exchanges (Freeman 1984 p.69).Provided that managers execute winwinexchanges SMC promises a powerful and usefulheuristic for effective strategic management (Carrolland Bucholtz 2006). Despite the optimism thisstrategic and largely instrumental approach has comeunder fire. It is rightly pointed out that although atransactional account of stakeholder relationships mayhelp to balance stakeholder currencies SMC fails toprovide managerial direction regarding how to conceptualize address and resolve normative intereststhat resist commoditization. Adapting a commonexample normative demands for the end of sweatshop labor are often not leveraged as pleas forbalancing the transactional interests of slave laboragainst the interests of the business organization.396Abe ZakhemOn the contrary claims of this kind constituteoutright rejections of exploitive labor practices byway of a universal appeal to non-transferable humanrights. Without much effort we can identify a widevariety of similar claims (e.g. deeply held community values and demands for corporate legitimacy)that call for the recognition and enforcement ofdeeply held and non-economic moral obligations.To reduce such interests to the status of negotiableassets seems both morally objectionable and toosimple a model for effectively capturing the complexnature of normative conflict (Orts and Strudler2002 p.222). The problem is further exacerbated bythe fact that any single strategic initiative can serveas a normative flash point for competing stakeholderconceptions of that which is good right andlegitimate.Certainly the normative and practical limitationsof a purely transactional orientation to stakeholdermanagement constitutes a recognized concern.Within stakeholder literature this concern has beenmet with rather traditional and largely deontologicalattempts to instill in managerial analysis a moralpoint of view that is sufficient for integratingconceptions of the good and the right (Evan andFreeman 1993). Expanding the debate this paperaddresses normative SMC concerns from a discoursetheoretical perspective. Accordingly the firstpart of the paper outlines the central features ofJurgen Habermas theory of communicative actiondiscourse ethics and political theory and sets up ageneral framework for a discoursetheoreticalapproach. Particular attention will be paid todefining a moral point of view from a discourseethical perspective. The second part advancesprevious applications of Habermasian critical theoryto stakeholder management by recasting the SMCcategories of rational process and transactionalanalysis in light of central discoursetheoreticalprinciples. Finally the third and final part summarizes the following conclusions. First that rationalstakeholder mapping should be regarded as adynamic and discursive process that is ultimatelydriven towards mutual understanding and participatory solidarity. Second that overcoming gapsbetween discourse and practice requires continuedprocess analysis at both strategic and operationallevels. Lastly that the bottom line for SMC mustbe determined from a moral point of view.Communicative action and discourseEchoing prominent social action theory Habermassupports the claim that social solidarity and orderrequire a basic level of norm regulated coordinationand conduct. Moving beyond traditional attempts toaccount for the binding power of social normsHabermas advances the concept of communicativepractices. Properly defined communicative practicesrefer to those social interactions that are driventowards dialogically motivating sustaining andrenewing intersubjective consensus and mutualunderstanding (Habermas 1984 p.17). In shortHabermas explains that speakers of a languageexpress criticizable validity claims concerning howsocial action ought to be structured. Speakersfurther warrant that if called upon they will providepublicly justified reasons and point to sharedconvictions that support their contentions. Understanding the very conditions of validity hearerslikewise commit to respond with counteractingreasons in the event of disagreement and dispute.Collectively both parties commit to an intersubjective and consensual process of reasoning withthe illocutionary goal of achieving mutualunderstanding. Habermas refers to this process ascommunicative reasoning (Habermas 1984p.11). Within this framework social norms ultimately owe their binding force to the fact thatdefinitive obligations on the parts of speakersand hearers are incurred in the collective pursuit ofrational and consensual agreement.Although foundational communicative practicescertainly do not account for or adequately explain allof the mechanisms affecting social order and coordination. In fact communicative appeals are oftenrejected in favor of dogmatically held worldviewsand perlocutionary aims and goals. Habermas usesthe category of rational-purposive action toexplain the mode of reasoning at work in such situations. As opposed to communicative reasoning andaction rational-purposive reasoning is not orientedtowards mutual understanding and consent and tendsto assess situational significance relative to an agentsown privately held interests and standards ofchoice. Although a necessary component of socialinteraction and coordination Habermas observesthat lifeworld orientations dominated by operationalized forms of rational-purposive reasoning tend toStakeholder Management Capabilityreduce meaningful action to strategic action.Strategic actions are thusly defined as attempts toinfluence situations and the behavior of other socialagents with the intent of advancing individual ends(Habermas 1984).The pervasive rationalization of strategic orientations however carries with it two interrelatedproblems and one clear way out. First Habermasobserves that the reduction of meaningful socialinteraction to strategic considerations resoundinglyerodes the communicative glue that producesmutual understanding and social solidarity. Thiserosion in turn contributes to such social pathologiesas lifeworld fragmentation legitimation crises anomie alienation and social dissonance (Habermas1987 p.143). Second strategic actions tend todevolve into the use and application of morallyquestionable means such as force threats violenceor inducements to manipulate rational opponents.For Habermas the solution to this problem does notrely on a simple denunciation of strategic actions. Ifwe desire to avoid the ill effects of strategic actionthen we first ought to harmonize our plans andpursue our individual and private goals on thecondition of communicative agreement (Habermas1984 p.86). In other words communicative agreement and action must serve as the horizon againstwhich strategic actions are understood evaluatedand harmonized. When communicative bonds arebroken which is often the case in modern pluralisticsocieties we require a complementary processthrough which the fabric of communicativeaction is repaired (Smith 2004 pp. 318320).In order to draw out such a process recall Habermas theory of communicative action. As notedcommunicative action rests on expressed warrantsand commitments directed towards an intersubjective and dialogical pursuit of mutual understanding.Distinct from motivating rational participants by wayof brute force or enticement the rationality inherentin communicative practices is seen in the fact that acommunicatively achieved agreement must be basedin the end on reasons (Habermas 1984 p.17).Further all competent speakers of language areaware of these conditions of validity and likewisebear some level of communicative obligation. Thusfrom the very beginning communicative practicespoint to a highly cognitive and argumentativeform of conflict resolution. In this sense397argumentation does not refer to mere rhetoricaldebate. On the contrary argumentation marks areflective form of communicative action wherebycompetent speakers can thematize and disputeoperative validity claims with the aim of achievingmutual understanding (Habermas 1984 p. 25). Inother words Habermas regards the turn towardsargumentation as constituting a rational court ofappeal that makes it possible to reestablish communicative understanding in spite of participatorydisagreement (Habermas 1984 p.1718).Habermas further explains that efforts toargumentatively preserve communicative action inthe face of disagreement must meet certain dialogicalconditions. In general these dialogical conditionsmust collectively ensure that validity claims are theobjects of discussion and that discursive outputsreflect an intersubjective and rationally motivatedagreement. Habermas specifies certain dialogicalconditions within the framework of the discourseprinciple (D). In its most basic form (D) states thatjust those action norms are valid to which allpossibly affected persons could agree as participantsin rational discourses (Habermas 1996 p. 107). Assuch (D) is the point of view from which norms ofaction can be impartially justified. Implied by (D)the general requirements for rational discourse include: the exclusion of coercive forces and strategicinfluences truthfulness freedom of access to information equal participatory rights and reciprocalrole taking and ideal role taking or the reciprocalreversal and checking of participatory points of view.As such discourse creates the necessary spacewhereby competent speakers disengage from problematized action contexts isolate validity claims andreach a rationally and communicatively motivatedagreement (Habermas 1996 pp.108109).Whereas (D) represents an ideal and irreducible order that is built into communicativelystructured forms of life in general actual discoursestake on different forms and require different sorts ofdiscursive rules. Much of Habermas more recentwork in political theory and discourse ethics relieson distinguishing the separate realms of pragmaticethical moral and legitimacy based discourses(Habermas 1996; 1993; 1990). While each form ofdiscourse in some way reflects (D) and thus requiresthe same basic sorts of discursive rules operationalized discourses differ with respect to various features:398Abe Zakhemthe discursive goals at hand argumentative criteriathe required level of preexisting and backgroundconsensus the scope of the validity claim in question and the status of discursive participants (Reed1999). In short as the nature of the validity claim inquestion changes the contours of rational discourselikewise change and imply different and more or lessstringent cognitive and procedural demands. Inorder to draw out these distinctions the followingsub-sections briefly explain the different forms ofdiscourse and clarify that which constitutes and givesdialogical weight to reasoning from a moral pointof view.Pragmatic discoursePragmatic discourse centers on collectively determining the best way to achieve predeterminedends preferences and goals. While engaged inpragmatic discourse participants advance variousstrategic or technical recommendations and evaluatepossible courses of action in light of accepteddecision-making criteria. More often than notpragmatic strategies are assessed against a standard ofefficiency and direct participatory attention towardsthe critical evaluation of empirical data (Habermas1996 p. 160). The selection of the particularstrategy would then provide a rational basis forimplementing certain situational definitions andnorms and providing a context for understandingand interacting with others. It is critical to note thata discursive assessment of pragmatic validity claimsrequires a high-level of preexisting communicativeconsensus relative to that which is determined to begood right and legitimate. So even as (D) ideallyrequires the consideration of all possibly affectedpersons pragmatic discourse must draw on a previously achieved communicative consensus.Accordingly the outputs of pragmatic discourseconstitute hypothetical imperatives ultimatelygrounded in particular and historically and culturallycontingent social action situations. When thisshared level of meaning is called into question (i.e.the validity claims turn from pragmatic contestations to questions concerning the good right orlegitimate) the application of (D) takes a differentform as do the corresponding features of rationaldiscourse.Ethical discourseDistinct from pragmatic discourse the goal of ethicaldiscourse is to collectively determine that which isgood for an individual community or association.As such ethical discourse counts as one distinct realmof normativity (Reed 1999b). Engaging in ethicaldiscourse involves proffering arguments in the form ofclinical advice with the intent of reaching a consensus over guiding values or deep preferences. Inother words ethical discourse engages participants in ahigher form of self-clarification and understanding bywhich they become reflectively aware of deepernormative consonances in a common form of life(Habermas 1996 p. 160161). Unlike pragmaticclaims ethical arguments are assessed against a standard of authenticity and direct participatory attentiontowards the critical evaluation of various forms of thegood life. The selection of an authentic identitywould then provide a rationally motivated and evaluative basis for assessing certain pragmatic claims (e.g.organizational goals aims values and pragmaticargumentative criterion) determining situational definitions and interacting and engaging with others.Similar to strategic determinations regarding thebest technical recommendations it is important tonote that conceptions of the good are also grounded in particular non-generalizable life histories thevalidity claims therein constituting hypothetical orconditional imperatives that are issued from andevaluated against the backdrop of certain unproblematic meaning structures. Within ethical discourse(D) is likewise indirectly applied as appealing to allmembers sharing particular traditions and strongevaluations (Habermas 1996 p.108). Yet when theunproblematic meaning structures required for ethicaldiscourse are called into question notably on groundsthat particular ways of life are unjust or illegitimate anapplication of (D) makes additional demands.Moral discourseDistinct from both pragmatic and ethical discoursemoral discourse is geared towards rationally andcollectively determining that which is right. As suchmoral questions constitute a second realm of normativity. Specifically moral discourse involves theredemption of maxims and norms relative to theirStakeholder Management Capability399compatibility with the maxims and norms of others(Habermas 1993 p.6). Towing a decidedly Kantianline Habermas argues that only a maxim that can begeneralized from the perspective of all affected countsas a norm that can command general assent and to thatextent is worthy of recognition or in other words ismorally binding (Habermas 1993 p.8). For Habermas however if we expect to find a rationallymotivated and generally binding agreement then wemust throw into relief those questions that can beresolved by an appeal to a generalizable interest; inother words questions of justice (Habermas 1993p.151). Parting with Kantian moral theory consideredto permit a monological application of universalityHabermas approach rests on the intersubjective anddialogical determination of that which is just. Sowhile moral discourse requires an application of theprinciple of universalization (U) it is applied as a ruleof argumentation stating that a norm is valid only ifall affected can accept the consequences and the sideeffects its general observance can be anticipated tohave for the satisfaction of everyones interests (andthese consequences are preferred to those of knownalternative possibilities). Correspondingly (D) as seenfrom a moral point of view requires that only thosenorms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet)with the approval of all affected in their capacity asparticipants in a practical discourse (Habermas 1993pp.6566). Within this context a moral point ofview involves separating out questions of justice andthen dialogically testing the validity of social normsvis-a`-vis (U). Distinct from pragmatic and ethicaldiscourse the cognitive requirements of moral discourse requires an idealizing moment of universality that effectively distances participants from thecontexts of life in which their particular identity isinterwoven and as such proffers categorical actionnorms (Habermas 1993 p.12). Despite the possibilityof moral convergence there remains the distinctreality that in our complex pluralistic and fragmentedsociety conflict between that which is efficaciousgood and are inevitable.legitimacy-based discourse aims at ensuring thatpragmatic ethical and moral discourses are supportedand that the outputs of which are reflected in largerpolitical and legislative institutions. Although acomplete explication and defense of Habermaspolitical theory is well beyond the scope and intent ofthis paper the central argument is that legitimacyultimately derives from the communicative power ofcitizens (Habermas 1996 151). As Darryl Reedexplains It is the exercise of communicative actionin public discourses (involving moral ethical andpragmatic concerns) carried out through a web ofpolitical institutions which generates the basis forlegitimate law (Reed 1999b p.26). Understandinglegitimacy in this way Habermas reconfigures (D) interms of a principle of democracy: only those statuesmay claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent ofall citizens in a discursive process of legislation.(Habermas 1996 p.110) This move carries with ittwo general implications. First there must be a systemof rights to ensure that (D) can take the shape of aprinciple of democracy through the medium of law.Primarily these rights include various guarantees(e.g. freedom of opinion and equal entitlement forinfluencing political will formation) for securing andbalancing private and public autonomy. (Habermas1996 pp.128129) Second there must be definedprinciples that serve to steer administrative processesand transform communicative power into administrative power (Habermas 1996 pp.168176). Theseprinciples include ensuring popular sovereigntypolitical pluralism equal protection under the lawand the separation of state and society (Habermas1996 pp. 122123). Whereas the previous forms ofrational discourse elicit either hypothetical or universal imperatives the outputs of legitimacy-baseddiscourse reflect a dual nature. The dual faced natureof legal validity is expressed in the fact that legalnorms enable the pursuit of self-interest while at thesame time stem from a discursive process that carriesthe mark of communicative legitimacy (Habermas1996 p.31).LegitimacyThe priority of the rightDiscourse regarding legitimacy constitutes a thirdrealm of normativity quite distinct from ethical andmoral orientations. Playing a largely integrative roleAs we have seen Habermas discursive account aimsto elaborate communicative means for achievingsocial solidarity and order resolving conflict and400Abe Zakhemregulating egoistic pursuits. Success in this endeavoraccordingly requires a rather complex array ofdiscourses situated at each of the previouslydifferentiated and operationalized levels. Despite theimportance of fostering all forms of discoursesHabermas grants dialogical priority to moral issues.Earlier noted a moral point of view constitutesthe privileged and idealized perspective from whichquestions of justice can be rationally and impartiallytested. On what grounds does Habermas support atheory of the right over the good? Well stated inother more detailed commentaries (Rehg 1994)Habermas accepts as a contemporary social factthat our post-traditional world is marked bynumerous fragmented and conflicting conceptionsof the good life. Although perhaps compelling for aparticular form of life ethical and other hypotheticalimperatives lack the intersubjective force necessaryfor communicatively bridging the normative gapbetween competing forms of life. For Habermasonly norms that find universal assent can serve as afoundation for normatively and communicativelystructured social interactions (Rehg 1994 pp.94100). The dialogical priority of the right over thegood is explained as follows. If we want to buildsolidarity and avoid the ill consequences of instrumental reasoning and strategic action then we mustgive first priority to rationally and communicativelyresolving questions of justice.While moral discourse provides a fundamentalbasis for universal agreement the cognitive forcebehind dialogically motivated moral validity claims isweak and suffers from unprecedented cognitivemotivational and organizational demands (Habermas 1996 pp.114118). Simply put moral discourse requires complementary processes andinstitutional forms for spreading decontextualizedmoral insight through complex strategically drivenand pluralistic forms of life. Habermas explains thatonly those forms of life that meet universalistmoralities halfwayfulfill the conditions necessary toreverse the abstractive achievements of decontextualization and demotivation (Habermas 1990p.109). As we have seen the formulation of legitimate law and institutions represents a crucial component in achieving this end. We must rememberhowever that Habermas understands legitimacy asultimately deriving its force from the communicativepower of citizens. Further that this communicativepower must first be developed vis-a`-vis robust publicdiscourses concerning that which is pragmatic goodand just. How exactly can we expect to meetuniversalistic moralities half way? Following Rehgone should seek incorporate discoursetheoreticalintuitions in the decision-making procedures andorganizational processes of various types of institutions (Rehg 1994 230). Accordingly Section 2attempts to meet this demand by drawing out discoursetheoretical implications for SMC rationalprocess and transactional analysis.Implications for stakeholder managementcapabilityAt the beginning of this paper we identified a persistent and unresolved problem with the transactionaland largely instrumental foundation of SMC. In shorttreating all stakeholder interests as balanceable commodities was found to be morally objectionable andthus unable to capture the complex nature of normative conflict. We now know that stakeholderclaims come in different varieties and carry with themdistinct cognitive demands. In many cases stakeholders and business organizations share similar values(e.g. economic efficiency return on investment costminimization) and norms (e.g. principles of meritocracy) sufficient for resolving disputes throughtraditional economic means (e.g. transactional bargaining negotiation and exchange). At other timeshowever stakeholder claims are aimed at criticizingthe dominant perspective through which interests arecommonly understood and valuated. Such is the casewith the example of sweatshop labor presented in theintroduction. Stakeholder claims of this kind aredecidedly more radical in that they serve to challenge prevailing economic and exchange-based horizons of understanding. How are managers to captureand resolve these more radical normative contestationswithout immediate recourse to transactional decisionmaking models? Unfortunately SMC fails to providemanagers with a coherent framework for answeringsuch questions. Attempts to address this concern bysimply asserting that managers ought to in some waybalance competing conceptions of the good and theright (Evan and Freeman 1993) are at best leftwanting of further explanation and at worst guilty ofbegging the question.Stakeholder Management CapabilityA discoursetheoretical approach provides somecritical insight as to how to understand and movebeyond these difficulties. Essentially in the face ofmore radical normative conflict managers maychoose to adopt one of two general orientations.Option 1: managers can take a strategic orientationand endeavor to influence stakeholder relationshipsin ways that advance private organizationalinterests. Although at some level necessary forconducting business we found that when leftunchecked strategic action tends to denigrate intothe use of morally questionable means of influence(e.g. coercion inducement or even violence).Additionally relationships that are largely strategic innature fail to produce the communicative gluenecessary for a more robust form of mutual understanding and solidarity. Given that both of theproblems associated with strategic responses undercut the normative acceptability and practical utilityof SMC we require another approach. ThereforeOption 2: prior to applying strategic standards ofevaluation managers ought to seek a communicatively driven normative consensus between stakeholders regarding generalizable and shared interests.In short strategic interactions must first be based onand in someway reflect an intersubjective and dialogical recognition of that which is good right andlegitimate with special priority given to moralissues.Although there is ongoing philosophical debateover many aspects of Habermas theory of communicative action and discourse a brief review of thebusiness ethics literature suggests that theorists arebeginning to note distinct discoursetheoreticaladvantages over more traditional managementapproaches. On empirical grounds a discoursetheoretical approach is said to better describe thenature of stakeholder relationships and draw out amore accurate picture of pluralistic and seeminglydivergent stakeholder claims (Waxenberger andSpence 2003). On economic grounds the communicative model is proving to be a compellingmodel for determining and advancing organizationalaims and goals (Smith 2004) and serving as amechanism for economic coordination (Kesting1998). Finally normative advantages include theability for a discourse-theoretical approach tosystematically incorporate various forms of normative reasoning (e.g. virtue deontological and401consequentialist approaches) provide a more robustaccount of social consent (Reed 1999a) and gain adeeper understanding of human rights and corporatelegitimacy (Van de Ven 2005). Contributing tothese ends the following sub-sections will advanceprevious attempts to integrate Habermasian criticaltheory with SMC (Jonker and Foster 2002) andrethink the traditional categories of rational processand transactional analysis in light of central discoursetheoretical principles.Rational level of analysisThe first step in enhancing stakeholder managementcapability is to rationally map organization stakeholder groups and define stakes of each. Regardlessof the specific analytical techniques involvedapplying a discoursetheoretical approach to stakeholder mapping yields two primary conclusions.First the determination of who and what reallycounts ought to be the result of operationalizedforms of discursive reasoning. Although this requiresa rather complex array of multi-leveled discoursessome general suggestions are as follows. At an ethicallevel we could expect that managers rationallyappraise an organizations mission values and culture and ultimately pose the question Who are weand what would we like to become? Since thedetermination of organizational identity will necessary cut across and impact various conceptions of thegood life ethical discourses should be structured toinclude participation from all stakeholders that arepart of larger business communities (e.g. employeesshareholders subcontractors and local communities). At a moral level discursive participants willlikely extend beyond the traditionally defined business community (e.g. across industries and downsupply chains) and consist of all those groups impacted by operative principles of justice which mayinclude competitors. Within todays business environment moral questions will likely focus on issuesof economic opportunity fair trade and competition fair labor practices and compensation and fairglobal development strategies to name a few.Regarding questions of legitimacy organizations areminimally required to support the formulation oflegitimate law and where appropriate activelycontribute to the communicative resolution of402Abe Zakhemcompeting pragmatic ethical and moral claims.Given the globalized nature of business organizations should also seek to structure or otherwisereform governmental and non-governmental international institutions based on the discursive principleof democracy. As scholars have already noted thismay be accomplished by modeling internationalgovernance bodies and organizational standards inaccordance with communicative principles (Steffek2003).Second a rational stakeholder map must representdiscursive outputs in their categorically differentiatedforms. By treating all stakeholder claims in the sameway we noted that SMC arbitrary elides logicaldifferences between the types of validity claims andthus misses opportunities for rational discourse andmutual understanding. Accordingly stakeholdermaps should now clearly lay out the various types ofpragmatic ethical moral and legitimacy-basedclaims and likewise specify the values moral normsand legal norms upon which such claims are founded. In short managers must understand stakeholders as discursive claimants who leverage varioustypes of normative claims qua community membernatural person and citizen. This may make stakeholder mapping a more complex and difficultactivity. Stakeholders claims however can nolonger be simply represented as extant interests thatare fully captured and strategically understoodthrough the lens of transactional exchange. On thecontrary to reduce all stakeholders interests tobalanceable commodities myopically reduces managerial vision and analysis to only one largely strategic aspect of rational analysis. Additionallystakeholder salience must reflect rational analysisfrom a moral point of view. Given the dialogicalpriority of moral questions managers should highlight those claims that can be resolved in relation to auniversalizable interest. Accomplishing this taskrational stakeholder maps should be structured tothrow into relief questions of justice perhaps asspecial characteristics or those features of stakeholder interaction that indicate a requirement ofparticular and continued attention.This analysis only points in the direction of somegeneral applications of a discoursetheoreticalapproach to rational stakeholder mapping. Indeedmuch work is still needed to develop specificstrategies that support discursive arrangements andanalytic techniques for mapping the complex worldof stakeholder interaction. This of course is nosmall task. That which should become clear however is the determination of stakeholder identity andsalience is a now regarded as a dynamic anddiscursive process that is ultimately driven towardsmutual understanding and participatory solidarity.Further this process will be narrowly or broadlyconstrued depending on the nature of the validityclaim in question and the level of required discursiveparticipation. In any event rational mapping mustbe designed to effectively move organizations outfrom cloistered positions of strategic analysis and intoa more engaged and normatively structured societaldialogues. This requirement seems perfectly consistent with the spirit and intent of stakeholder management and the goals of rational mapping.Process level of analysisThe second step in enhancing an organizationsstakeholder management capability is to align business processes with the normative outputs derived.In line with a discourse-theoretical analysis organizational processes ought to be evaluated andaccordingly restructured in line with shared conceptions of that which is good right and legitimate.On the practical front managers can certainly expectthat there will be definitive gaps between discursively determined values moral norms and legalnorms and actual practice. A particular challenge forbridging the gap between discourse and practice isthe fact that business organizations often reflectdeep-seated propensities for strategic action and resist evening out unequal distributions of power. Inlight of this apparent difficulty pressing questionscome to the fore. How can managers effectivelyintegrate communicative and strategic actions? Whatsorts of organizational process are required to meetnormative discourses half way? How can a moralpoint of view take root in environments hostile touniversalistic moralities? Overcoming these challenges requires reconfiguring organizational processat two complementary levels.First managers ought to bring stakeholders intostrategic decision-making processes. Freeman recognizes early on that a primary means for effectively aligning interests is to include stakeholderStakeholder Management Capabilityparticipation at various levels of strategic planning.(Freeman 1983; Freeman 1984 p.69). In thisway stakeholders will set the strategic tone for abusiness organization from the top down. In discoursetheoretical terms this implies that bridgingthe gap between rational analysis and practicerequires stakeholder representation in a variety ofexecutive and operationalized forms of pragmaticdiscourse. To this point there has been a considerable amount of research suggesting how thiscan actually be accomplished. Jeffery Smith forexample cites several examples (e.g. at SaturnCorporation) where organizations successfully linkthe pursuit of strategic ends and communicativelyoriented actions (Smith 2004). Other scholarshave developed communicative means for effectiveenvironmental analysis screening and reporting(Wiklund 2005; Dayton 2002) enterprise planning (Dillard and Yuthas 2006) and strategicdevelopment efforts in developing countries(Reed 2002). Bringing stakeholders into higherlevel strategic and pragmatic discourses howeveris but one piece of the puzzle. Bridging the gapbetween discourse and practice requires additionalprocess analysis.Second managers ought to analyze and designmanagement systems to ensure that an organizationsday-to-day operations reflect and meet stakeholderclaims. Complementing efforts at the strategic planning level stakeholders will also need to set theoperational tone of an organization from the bottomup so to speak. Unfortunately as others have pointedout this aspect of process analysis once prominent inFreemans earlier writings has since been undulyneglected (Jonker and Foster 2002 p.190). Turningour attention to this level of analysis from a discoursetheoretical perspective yields valuable insight. Inparticular it means that management systems shouldbe in place to ensure that shared conceptions of thegood right and legitimate are communicatively reflected in an organizations everyday operations.Although there are many types of managementsystems that could fit the bill there are good reasonsfor suggesting that modeling organizational ethicsprograms along discoursetheoretical lines is a goodstarting place. First ethical programs have proven tobe effective and systematic means for positivelyinfluencing organizational-ethical culture (Izraeli andSchwartz 1998). Second the key components for an403effective ethics program are well defined in US federal law and flexible enough to apply to all types ofbusiness organizations (Palmer and Zakhem 2001).Finally there is a growing movement that suggeststhat ethical programs should be designed and ultimately evaluated from a moral point of view(Reynolds and Bowie 2004).Although we cannot apply discoursetheoreticalprinciples to all components of a robust ethicalprogram several implications seem obvious. Ethicalcodes of conduct mission statements and procedures should appropriately reflect shared valuesmoral norms and legal norms. Such documentationshould be communicatively transmitted understoodat all levels of the organization and be open torational criticism and change. Ethical training programs should include means to develop communicative competence and moral reasoning. Perhapsmost importantly ethical audits should be conductedto both monitor system performance and serve as acatalyst for introducing a moral point of view intocompany operations and routine processes (GarciaMarza 2005). In other words ethical programeffectiveness and process capability should be auditedand evaluated in large part against the level ofcommunicatively and discursively achieved agreement and solidarity. Furthermore the results ofethical audits should be publicly reported in amanner consistent with communicative principles(Yuthas et al. 2002).Again this analysis only points in the generaldirection of how to analyze and structure organizational processes from a discoursetheoretical perspective. We should however come to therealization that overcoming gaps between discourseand practice requires continued process analysis at alllevels of the organization.Transactional level of analysisThe final step in enhancing and organizations stakeholder management capability is for managers toestablish and execute winwin transactionalexchanges with stakeholders. It is through transactional processes that managers must at some levelengage stakeholders in an effort to surface discontentand balance competing claims. In this arena it canalso be expected that both managers and stakeholders404Abe Zakhemwill and perhaps must exert some level of strategicinfluence. While transactional negotiation and exchange should continue to play a central role it can nolonger be regarded as the bottom line for stakeholder management. As Robert Phillips recognizesstakeholder relationships should have moral restrictions rather than being merely strategic in nature(Phillips 2003 p.38). From a discoursetheoreticalperspective this means that transactional relationshipsought to be ultimately judged from a moral point ofview. In other words transactional interactions mustfirst be based on and in someway reflect an intersubjective and dialogical recognition of that which isright.In the complex world of business howeverestablishing shared normative convictions throughdiscourse is likely to be an ongoing fragile and oftenopen-ended task of argumentation learning andcontinual improvement. Accordingly managers willpotentially need to conduct business and engagestakeholders as transactional partners without necessarily fully realizing moral consensus. In theabsence of communicatively established moralnorms however bargaining can still occur and atleast indirectly reflect a moral point of view. AsHabermas recognizes bargaining processes areappropriately tailed for situations in which socialpower relations cannot be neutralized in the wayrational discourses presuppose. Whereas a rationallymotivated consensus rests on reasons that convinceall parties in the same way compromised bargainscan be accepted by the different parties each for itsown different reasons. While transactional bargaining cannot replace moral discourse it can be regulated from the standpoint of fairness. At a minimumthis requires that all negotiating parties be providedwith an equal opportunity to influence one anotherduring the actual bargaining so that all the affectedinterests can come into play and have equal changesof prevailing. (Habermas 1996 pp. 165167)Whether directly or indirectly the bottom linefor stakeholder management must be determinedfrom a moral point of view.Concluding remarksIn this paper we have articulated and analyzed apersistent problem with SMC transactional analysisand balancing. Recognizing the need to complement SMC analysis with a moral point of viewwe parted company with traditional normative approaches and recast morality in terms of Habermasdiscoursetheoretical and ultimately communicativeperspective. This exegesis leads to several importantimplications for SMC. First that stakeholder mapping should be regarded as a dynamic and discursiveprocess and one that is ultimately driven towardsachieving mutual understanding. Second thatovercoming gaps between discourse and practicerequires continued process analysis at both strategicand operational levels. Lastly that the bottom linefor transactional involvement with stakeholders mustbe determined from a moral point of view. Whilethis paper only provides a general framework foradapting discoursetheoretical principles to SMCanalysis the conclusions drawn will hopefully informmore detailed research.ReferencesCarrol A. and A. Buchholtz: 2006 Business and Society:Ethics and Stakeholder Management (Thomson Southwestern Belmont CA).Dayton D.: 2002 Evaluating Environmental ImpactStatements as Communicative Action Journal ofBusiness and Technical Communication 16(4) 355405.Dillard J. and K. Yuthas: 2006 Enterprise ResourcePlanning Systems and Communicative Action CriticalPerspectives on Accounting 12(2/3) 202.Evan W. and R. Freeman: 1993 A Stakeholder Theoryof the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism inT. Beauchamp and N. Bowie (eds.) Ethical Theory andBusiness 4th ed. (Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs NJ)pp. 7584.Freeman R.: 1984 Strategic Management: A StakeholderApproach (Pittman Boston MA).Garcia-Marza D.: 2005 Trust and Dialogue: TheoreticalApproaches to Ethics Auditing Journal of BusinessEthics 57 209219.Habermas J.: 1984 The Theory of Communicative Action(vol. 1) trans. by T. McCarthy (Beacon Press BostonMA).Habermas J.: 1987 The Theory of Communicative Action(vol. 2) trans. by T. McCarthy (Beacon Press BostonMA).Habermas J.: 1990 Moral Consciousness and CommunicativeAction trans. by C. Lenhardt and S. Nicholsen (TheMIT Press Cambridge MA).Stakeholder Management CapabilityHabermas J.: 1993 Justification and Application: Remarks onDiscourse Ethics trans. by C. Cronin (The MIT PressCambridge MA).Habermas J.: 1996 Between Facts and Norms: Contributionsto a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy trans. by W.Rehg (The MIT Press Cambridge MA).Izraeli D. and M. Schwartz: 1998 What Can We Learnfrom the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines forOrganizational Ethics? Journal of Business Ethics 1710451055.Jonker J. and D. Foster: 2002 Stakeholder Excellence?Framing the Evolution and Complexity of a StakeholderPerspective of the Firm Corporate Social Responsibilityand Environmental Management 9(4) 197195.Kesting S.: 1998 A Potential for Understanding and theInterference of Power: Discourse as an EconomicMechanism of Coordination Journal of Economic Issues32(4) 10531078.Orts E. and A. Strudler: 2002 The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory BusinessEthics Quarterly 12(2) 215233.Palmer D. and A. Zakhem: 2001 Bridging the GapBetween Theory and Practice: Using the 1991 FederalSentencing Guidelines as a Paradigm for EthicsTraining Journal of Business Ethics 29 7784.Phillips R.: 2003 Stakeholder Legitimacy BusinessEthics Quarterly 12(1) 2541.Reed D.: 2002 Employing Normative StakeholderTheory in Developing Countries: A Critical TheoryPerspective Business and Society 41(2) 166183.Reed D.: 1999a Stakeholder Management: A CriticalTheory Perspective Business Ethics Quarterly 9(3)453483.Reed D.: 1999b Three Realms of Corporate Responsibility: Distinguishing Legitimacy Morality andEthics Journal of Business Ethics 21 2335.405Rehg W.: 1994 Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethicsof Jurgen Habermas (University of California PressBerkeley CA).Reynolds S. and N. Bowie: 2004 A Kantian Perspectiveon the Characteristics of Ethics Programs BusinessEthics Quarterly 14 275292.Smith J.: 2004 A Precis of a Communicative Theory ofthe Firm Business Ethics: A European Review 13(4)317331.Steffek J.: 2003 The Legitimation of InternationalGovernance: A Discourse Approach European Journalof International Relations 9(2) 249275.Van de Ven B. : 2005 Human Rights as a NormativeBasis for Stakeholder Legitimacy Corporate Governance5(2) 4859.Waxenberger B. and L. Spence: 2003 Reinterpretationof a Metaphor: from Stakes to Claims Strategic Change12(5) 239249.Wiklund H.: 2005 In Search of Arenas for DemocraticDeliberation: a Habermasian Review of Environmental Assessment Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 23(4) 281292.Yuthas Y. R. Rogers and J. Dillard: 2002 Communicative Action and Corporate Annual Reports Journalof Business Ethics 41(2/1) 141157.Department of PhilosophySeton Hall University400 South Orange Avenue Fahy Hall South OrangeNJ 07042 U.S.AE-mail: zakhemab@shu.edu
"You need a similar assignment done from scratch? Our qualified writers will help you with a guaranteed AI-free & plagiarism-free A+ quality paper, Confidentiality, Timely delivery & Livechat/phone Support.
Discount Code: CIPD30
Click ORDER NOW..
